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IRISH FOREIGN POLICY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE EEC 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
In speaking to you this evening I  do not propose to discuss in a  comprehensive. 
way the origins or history or pre sent situation of Irish foreign policyJ- I  would . 
like instead to address myself to the more specific issue of the impact on 
Irish foreign policy of our membership of the EEC in so far as this can·be assessee 
after less than three years participation in the Community. 
I  propose to speak in the _first ulace of the direct impact of membership on 
Ireland and on its relations with Britain; secondly of our attitude to the future 
evolution of the Community,  its structures and institutions;  and thirdly of our 
role in the world as a  whole as a  member State of the evolving Community. 
DIRECT IMPACT OF MEMBERSHIP 
Within the Community since 1973,  as outside it before that time,  Irish foreign 
policy has had two broad aims: to protect and further Ireland's  national interest, 
perceived both in political  and economic terms; and at the same time to pursue 
what might be regarded as more 'idealistic  1  aims  - preserving peace in the 
world,  protecting human rights,  and achieving a  more equitable balance between 
the industrialised and developing countries. 
Membership of the EEC i\\now one of the corner stones of our foreign policy. 
The effect of our member~1h~  and our view of the future of the Community are 
\ 
perhaps most frequently ju~ed in terms of the first of these two general aims  -
that is in terms of direct impact on Irish national interest. 
Given Ireland's historical experience of exploitation by a  more powerful 
neighbour,  and given its peripheral situation and the fact that it is at an earlier 
stage of economic development than other member countries,  it is natural that 
it should consider that its interests within the Community are best served by· 
strengthening the guarantees against any form of discrimination and by working '  / 
/ 
/ 
/ 
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to extend the  range of those Community policies which are redistributive in 
character,  especially in so far as they relate to the redistribution of capital 
for investment purposes.  Additionally,  in view of the relatively large size of 
the  agricultural sector in Ireland,  the level of agricultural prices and the type 
and extent of agricultural structures policies pursued by the Community are 
matters of particular concern  .. 
Already at the time of our application for membership of the Community it has 
been the  judg~ment of  the then Government and of the principal opposition party 
at that time,  that in the event of Britain joining the EEC,  the clear balance o£' 
advantage for Ireland would lie with membership.  One could,  perhaps,  add 
that it was also believed that Ireland  1 s  position with the Community with Britain 
would be much more advantageous than its position had previously been outside the 
Coinmunity with Britain;  in other words that Britain's application for membership 
afforded Ireland a  chance,  by joining at the same time,  to improve its relationship 
both with Britain and with a  large part of Western Europe. 
The economic basis for this view is well known,  and need not be dwelt upon at any 
length.  But associated with the potential economic advantages of member ship were 
potential political <',dvantage s.  The lessening of Irish economic dependence on 
Britain seemed likely to extend Ireland  1 s  political freedom of action,  and eventually 
to eliminate the psychological hang-ups that were an inevitable feature of the highly 
polarised bilateral relationship which had previously existed between Ireland and 
Britain. 
\ 
Relationshi  between Irish an  U.K.  membershi 
In the light of these judgement  made before our entry it is interesting to note 
the reaction in Ireland after two years of membership the the question of whether 
Ireland should remain in the Community if the British electorate decided against 
membership in their  re~erendum  ~n June 1975.  Before Ireland joined the Community 
very few voices had been raised -my own being one of these few!  - to suggest that 
it should be a  member of the Community even if the United Kingdom were not, 
but three years later there was almost equal unanimity on the part of political· 
and public opinion that if Britain left,  Ireland should remain a  member  .  No • 
'"' 
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formal Government decision was taken to this effect  - Governments do not 
normally take formal decisions on hypothetical questions  - but the strength of 
the conviction that Ireland should remain in the Community even if Britain 
left was such that in a  sense no formal decision was needed. 
The importance of this reaction to the possibility of British withdrawal from 
the Community should not be under-estimated.  First,  from a  domestic point 
of view it reflected the confidence  of the. Irish Government and people in their 
ability to stand on their own feet within the Community.  Beyond this, however, 
it represented a  new stage in the eight-century-long period of Irish history that 
had been dominated by Ireland's relations with her nearest neighbour,  to the 
virtual exclusion of external considerations.  Finally,  the Irish attitude to 
membership in the perspective of a.  possible British withdrawal made a 
significant impact on the attitudes of other member States towards Ireland, 
It is true that since its membership became effective in January 1973 Ireland had 
been accepted by the original Six as a  constructive and useful member of the 
Community.  Irish attitudes on issues affecting the future development  of the 
Community,  and especially on institutional issues,  were seen as being clearly 
different from,  and much more 'communautaire' than,  those of the United 
Kingdom Government for example.  Nevertheless,  an impression may have 
persisted of some linkage between Irish and British membership. 
In these circumstances the willingness of Ireland to contemplate continuing 
membership of the Community even should Britain take the decision to withdraw, 
clearly impressed political leaders in the original six member States and led them 
to see Irish membership in\\ different light than  hitherto. 
\\ 
But already at the time of 19\2 referendum the various advantages of membership 
had been seen by the Irish people as outweighing by a  clear margin the disadva~tages 
e.g.  the limitations imposed by Community membership  on freedom of action 
in respect of certain economic policies,  and the requirement to free Ireland  1 s 
trade with the Continental Community countries within five years.  (Trade with 
Britain was,  of course,  already in process of being freed under the terms of 
the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement of 1965). 
The Irish electorate at that time expressed its views em,phatically on the merits of 
membership.  Despite set-backs to Irish hopes in respect of two aspects of 
.  ---• 
.~. 
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membership,  the judgement then made has since been validated by the experience 
of three years of membership. 
The first of these set-backs was the inadequacy of the Common Cattle and Beef 
Policy of the Community in the face  of the quite unexpected problem of a  world beef 
surplus in 1974; while the position of Ireland outside the Community would have 
been disastrous in this situation - for the Community banned all import~ of beef -
the Irish cattle producer certainly fared much worse in the second year of 
membership than he had expected to do. 
The second set-back was the gross inadequacy of the size of the Regional Fund, 
established under recession conditions in 1974 on a  scale which represented only· 
a  small fraction of the sums needed to make a  perceptible impact on the problems oj 
under -development in Ireland and Italy,  and with a  distribution 'key' that tended 
to favour the other member States. 
Apart from the inadequacy of the Con'lmon Cattle and Beef Policy in the face of 
an unexpected world surplus of beef in 1974,  the Common Agricultural Policy 
has generally lived up to expectations and has run beyond them,  perhaps,  in so 
far as milk is concerned.  In the area of social policy,  while the European 
Social Fund is inadequate to meet all the demands made on it,  the  £22 million 
allocated to Ireland to date must be reckoned to be an appreciable contribution 
towards social development in Ireland.  Finally,  the transfers to the Irish 
Exchequer from the Community,  which had been expected before membership 
to be initially of the order o~ £3 0 million attained a  figure of about £80  million 
in 1974,  the second year of\~mbership.  To this must be added a  further  £25 
million of loans from the Eu\opean Investment Bank  - more than had been 
expected under this heading also.  This inflow of £105 million  in the  second year of 
~ember  ship compared with a  membership 'fee'  of £ 7t million in that year.  These 
agricultural and financial benefits were only partially offset by the impact of freer 
industrial trade with Continental EEC countries. 
IRELAND'S ATTITUDE TO THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMUNITY 
Attitude to unanimity practice 
Our economic objective within the Community cannot, of course,  be pursued in .... 
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isolation from the  question of the institutional structure and decision-making 
arrangements within the Community  and this brings me to my second point -
Ireland's attitude to the evolution of the Community. 
The nature of our economic interests effectively dictates a  very positive attitude 
towards the institutional development of the Community and a  strengthening of 
its decision-making structures.  A  country whose economic situation within 
the Community at its present stage of development in strong could  see itself 
. 
as having an interest in protecting the institutional status quo and in preventing 
change,  and this could arguably be best achieved by maintaining as far as possible 
what is loosely called the 'veto'  - that is the practice of unanimity with regard 
to those decisions that are seen by a  member State as affecting a  vital national 
interest. 
But for countries whose economic position is weak,  and which need a development 
of redistributive Community policies,, the 'veto' is more likely to prove an 
obstacle;  their interests may be best served by movement away from the 
unanimity practice and towards majority voting.  There are some who do not 
agree with this view.  But I  believe that the experience of membership to-date has 
fully validated it. 
First,  the veto has been used with increasing frequency during the past couple 
of years to inhibit,  or to minimise the impact of,  new policies of the kind that 
would generally tend to favour the interests of a  country such as Ireland.  Example 
of this include the use of th\ veto to halt the first ef:Jbrt to establish a  Regional 
Fund,  and to minimise its '\~le when it was eventually set up,  as well as to 
prevent a  realistic level of \ommunity financing  for the Disadvantaged Areas 
Scheme. 
Secondly,  experience has shown that in practice it is much easier for a  larger and 
more powerful country to use the veto,  even in  r~spect  _of  matters of relatively 
minor importance. to it, _without experiencing any back-lash effect,  than it is for 
a  smaller country to do so,  even in respect of matters in which it has an 
important interest.  More widespread use of the  veto by larger countries 
reflects,  of course,  the much wider range of interests of these countries- but it 
also reflects the fact that they have less to fear by way of retalhtion than their 
smaller neighbours even where they use the veto in an abusive way.  A  small / 
.... 
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country,  even when seeking to protect a  genuine vital national interest, has to 
face the danger that if it pursues this interest beyond the limit of what other 
member countries,  expecially the larger ones,  regard as reasonable,  it may 
invite retaliation in respect of other matters in which  it has an interest. 
In this matter it is realistic to recognise that some are more equal than others! 
The belief that the interests of Ireland are best served by minimising the use 
of the unanimity principle,  and by extending the range of decisions takeri by 
majority vote,  is thus not just an a  priori ideological position, but has been 
validated by the experience actually gained during a  period of almost three 
years within the Cornmrmity. 
Role of Commission 
Another aspect of the institutional arrangements of the Cornmrmity in respect of 
which a  small country such as Ireland has an interest,  is the role of the European 
Commission in the decision-making process of the Community.  It has been 
argued since the establishment of the Community that the exclusive power of 
initiative of the European Commission in the formulating of legislative proposals is 
likely in practice to prove a  protection for the interests of smaller and 
economically weaker countries.  The extent to which this can be  so much,  of 
course,  depend on the degree of independence which the Commission enjoys in 
reality,  as distinct from in theory,  vis-a-vis member States.  It is widely 
held that since the Community was established the independence of the Commission 
has been significantly wea~ned.  It has been suggested that in formulating 
proposals the Commissio~  oday takes much greater account of the possible 
I 
political reactions by the  ~vernments of member States than it did at an earlier 
stage. 
I believe that there is some truth in this suggestion.  From an Irish point of 
view the clearest evidence for this proposition lies in the shape and content of 
the Regional Policy proposals put forward by the Commission in  197 3.  A  more 
recent example of what appears to be the increased sensitivity of the European 
Commission to political attitudes in member countries was the decision by the 
Commission to seek a  political debate in the Council of Ministers on the Greek 
application for membership before the Commission prepared its proposal with 
re-spect to this application. .... 
-7-
Nevertheless,  even if one accepts that the Commission  has over the years 
become more sensitive to political attitudes  in member States,  and somewhat 
less willing to put forward proposals on their own merits,  it still appears that the 
interests of the smaller States and weaker economies within the Community, 
and of  the Community as an entity,  are likely to be better served by decisions 
taken on the basis of proposals made by the Commission than by decisions 
drawn up on the basis of an exclusively political assessment of the different 
interests involved and their relative strengths at the bargaining table,  Thus 
the interests of the smaller and weaker countries would seem likely to be served 
by a  reinforcement and strengthening of the independence of the Commission,  as 
this would be likely to yield proposals more exclusively based on the merits of 
the case rather  than on considerations of political acceptability in the Cou..,cil of 
Ministers. 
The strengthening of the independence and role of the Commission will not be 
easy to accomplish within the present institutional arrangements.  Whatever 
may have been the intention  of the founding fathers of the Community,  the 
members  of the European Commission are not in practice selected to-day by 
the collective action of member States; each is nominated by his own member 
State,  subject only to a  right of veto by other members whose use is for practical 
purposes virtually inconceivable.  Moreover,  the power of the European 
Parliament to dismiss the Commission by a  two-thirds majority of its members 
is also in practice unusable. 
It may be necessary to cast around for  some new approach to this problem, 
which might at one and the \arne time secure a  more independent Commission, 
appointed collectively rathY\  than individually,  and one genuinely responsible to 
and resposive to the Europ'n Parliament.  One  vray of achieving this might be 
to start the process of appointment by a  collective choice of a  President for the 
Commission,  who,  having secured the endorsement of the European Parliament, 
would then choose his team,  with representation from each member State,  and 
submit it for approval to the Council of Ministers a::1d  to Parliament.  Other 
formulae are conceivable, however.  It would be ir, Ireland's interests in 
any event that some method be found of strengtheni.r.g the  Commission so that 
it may play. the kind of major political role in the Community originally 
envisaged for it. / 
i 
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Role of Parliament 
Irish policy favours both the strengthening of the powers of Parliament and the 
direct election of the Parliament.  It may be doubted whether the powers now 
enjoyed by Parliament,  even as recently increased in matters  of  budgetary 
policy,  are such as to make the European electorate wish to participate on a 
large scale in a  Direct Election to the European Parliament.  A  start in the 
process of gradual transformation of Parliament from a  largely consultative body 
to one with genuine legislative functions thus seems desirable,  in view of ili.e 
prospect of Direct Elections within two or three years.  The December 1974 
Paris Summit - subject to British and Danish reserves  -decided to hold Direct 
Elections in or after 1978.  I  may mention that this decision was taken on the 
proposal of the Taoiseach,  which reflects Ireland  1s  concern to democratise the 
Parliament as soon as possible. 
Ireland is concerned to maintain in the context of Direct Elections its share of 
parliamentary representation,  fixed by t..l}e  Accession Treaty at just over 5o/o, 
viz.  10  seats out of 198.  The proposal from the European Parliament for Direct 
Elections envisages,  however,  a  Parliament of 355 seats in which Ireland v•tould 
have 13  - only 3 2/3%.  Ireland could accept this kind of movement towards 
a  proportionate representation of th.a peoples of Europe in the Parliament if t.his 
were to be part of a  general institutional reform, involving the introduction of 
federal-type parliamentary institutions,  with two chambers  - a  Lower House 
elected on a  population basis and an Upper House with appropriate powers and 
equal representation -for e\ch member State,  as for example in the United States 
of America.  But the Iris'  ~overnrnent finds it hard to accept that in advance of 
the transition to such a  fed~al-type structure,  lri  sh r epr  e sen  ta  tion in the 
European Parliament should be watered down.  The Irish position on  this 
·point was received with some ·sympathy at the meeting ·of the Council of 
Ministers on Wednesday last,  5th November. 
Economic and Monetary  -Union 
Because of its concern for the cohesion of the Common Agricultural Policy, 
Ireland bas a  particular interest in the achievement of ~conqmic and Monetary 
Union,  over and above its general concern to see the Community develop bto · · ----9-
a  cohesive economic and political unit.  The moven1cnt apart of the exchange 
rates of member cormtries in the past few years has placed the Common 
Agricultural Policy tmder great stra~ and has involved the introduction of 
the system of Monetary Compensation Amounts which,  because they act in 
effect  as export taxes,  have been found to be disadvantageous to a  country such 
as Ireland.  The maintenance of the common agricultural price system,  whose 
establishment has been one of-the Community's major achievements; is 
clearly liable  to be affected over the long-term by an indefinite continuance of the 
present incoherence of the Commrmity exchange rate system. 
While Ireland's interests, not merely in respect of the Common Agricultural 
Policy but also,  more generally,  in respect of the developrre nt of the Community 
towards a  cohesive European Union,  require that progress be made towards 
Economic and Monetary Union,  it has to be recognised that the centripetal 
tendencies of a  'free-for-all' Economic and More tary Union would have to be 
firmly checked by the allocation of large-scale capital resources to the develop."'. 
ment of peripheral areas,  such as Ireland. 
of any real progress in this matter. 
This  is a  necessary pre -condition 
Ireland has no illusions about the difficulties in the way of establishing an  · 
Economic and Monetary Union.  There is a  long way to go before the more 
centrally-situated and prosperous member States realise and accept the scale 
of the capital transfers that would be necessary to secure an Economic and 
Monetary Union that would not drain the periphery of the Community;  the 
member States are moreover still far from a  realisation of the kind of 
frmdamental structural chan~~s that will be required to create the necessary basis 
for exchange rate harmoniz~'on.  Ireland's experience of a  n1onetary union 
with the United Kingdom has\;rovided it \vith an insight into the real issues at 
stake in the establishn1ent an~ maintenance of an Economic and Monetary Union. 
These include the need for component parts of a  Monetary Union to retain,  under 
Cornrnunity supervision,  certain economic weapons in order to prevent the 
emergence of a  serious imbalance between weaker and stronger areas,  rather 
than~ as has sometimes been too lightly assun1ed,  being required to give up their 
entire armoury of such weapons; and the pre -condition that a  fairly close 
harmonization of inflation rates, necessarily founded on a  harmonization of 
the growth of labour costs and thus of income~;,  be achieved.  The much higher 
inflation rates of Ireland and Britain are thus not merely dangerous  to the • 
.... 
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economies of these countries,  but <;1re  also an inhibition on movement towards. 
a  monetary union which  would safeguard Ireland  1 s  interest in the common !arm 
price system·  .  '  .·•  ·.· ..  •.:  . 
'  ·. 
It will be clear from  what has been said that the protection and advancement of 
Ireland's material intercasts is seen by the  Irish Government as requ!r!rig th~ 
pursuit of a  strongly •European  1 policy within the Community - involving clear 
..... 
support for further institutional development,  including Economic and Monetary 
Union,  and a  strengthening of the decision-making system within the qomrntmity 
on the basis of majority voting.~  National interest and what might be de  ec~ibed 
as European idealism thus tend to coincide in Ireland  1 s  case.  This policy :. : 
guided our approach in particular during the period of Ireland's Presidency o! 
the Council of Ministers.  ·, 
·.: 
... 
. .  . 
Initiatives during Irish Presidency· 
During that time Ireland took a  number of important initiatives within the 
Community.  It organised and presided oY=er  the first precedent-setting 
';I.  ·, 
European Council meeting,  held in Dublin.  It had the responsibility for  developing t 
the process by which in certain international fora, (:p.otably the Euro-Arab 
Dialogue,  the first Preparatory Meet:bg for the Conference on bternaticnn.l 
Economic Co-operation),  the Community speaks \.vith one voice through the 
Presidency and the Commission jointly.  It introduced the practice,  {since 
followed by the Italian Presidency),  of a  meeting behveen the President of the 
Council and the Commission to discuss the Work Programme before the 
\ 
commencement of the Presl\\cy. 
It established a  new link bet~en  the Presidency and the Econo,·nic  and Social 
Committee.  It established a  new and much closer relationship between the 
Presidency and the European Parliament,  and  initiated the process of answering 
questions on Political Co-operation matters in 'Ule  Parliament,  in accordance with 
a  decision of the December 1974 Paris Summit.  It made proposals for 
improvements  in the working methods of the Council,  one of which,  the 
prepa;rati on for the Council of Foreign Minist_ers of Progress Reports on the  .. 
working of specialised Councils, is already being put into effect.  And,  £bally,  it 
successfully introduced majority voting into the Council of  Fo.reign  Minister~, • 
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thus fulfilling a  mandate of the Paris Summit and opening the  way to much 
speedier and more effective decision-making in the Community. 
IR.E;LAND 'S ROLE IN THE WORLD AS A  MEMBER STATE OF THE COMMUNITY 
I now come to the third issue I  wish to consider -the effects of Irdand 1s 
membership of the Community on our role in world affairs in general. 
The most immediate effect is,  perhaps,  that we have  a  greater freedom of 
action in foreign relations bec'iuse of the reduction of Ireland's dependence of 
the United Kingdom -which is by no-means completely offset by the pressures 
to secure a  co-ordination of foreign policy within  the framework of European 
Political Co -operation.  The inter-dependent character of relations between 
Community States,  each of which needs the  support,  or at any  rate acquiescence, 
of its partners in order to secure a  favourable outcome in respect of _a  wide 
range of Community decisions,  is a  notably more healthy,  and less neurotic, 
relationship than that of economic and political dependence with which Ireland 
had been all too familiar prior to its membership of the Community.  A  by-
product of this new situation is an improvement in the quality of the Anglo -Irish 
relationship,  all the more important because it has occurred at a  time when the 
problem of Northern Ireland has inevitably been testing this relationship. 
Ireland's participation in the Community and in the work of Political Co -operation 
has markedly enhanced its influence in international affairs,  and has enormously 
In the field of the Community's  widened the geographical rangrtf this influence. 
external relations the Irish Pr1 e  idency played an active and indeed crucial role 
I 
in the concluding negotiations !'t 46 African,  Ca ribean,  Indian Ocean and Pacific 
,  (~  countries,  which culminateci in t  e  Lome  .-onvention.  By its diplomatic action 
through the Presidency of the  Community negotiating team.for the Euro-Arab 
Dialogue it removed several road-blocks that stood in the way -of the further 
development of this Dialogue,  which,  when Ireland took over the Presidency,  was 
in a  state of suspended animation.  It play·ed a  key role in ensuring that the 
outcome of the first Preparatory Meeting for the Conierence on Internation 
Economic Co -operation, held in Paris in April,  would be such as to leave open· 
....  the possibility of maximising further .opportunities to get this Conference off the 
gro~d - a  contribution which has since borne fruit in a  second successful 
i 
Preparatory Conference.  It was able to contribute in a  significant way to a -~-~---~---------------------
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positive dnclopmcnt of 1he Commnnity's policy vi:::-~,-~\-i;,;  Portuge1l.  It \'; ;J s  1n 
a  position to f<lcilitatc  tlE~  successful renegoti;ction of n,c  United Kingdom's 
membership of the Europc2_n CoiT1rnunity.  And uncle r  its P::c  ~;idcncy there was 
a  significant irnprove:rnent in relations bct\vecn the  United St;ttcs and the EEC which 
had been unsatisfactory during 197  3  and 1974. 
Ireland 
1 s  direct intc:rc  ~~t  in  some of these  diplornc:~tic achiever::.1c.nts  may have been 
relatively srnall :in  t_he  sense thr1t its  ixr>rncdiC~te rnaterial interests \VOLild not in so1ne 
cases hctve been snbstantially affected  h;:~d these develop.c:1cnts not occu1·red.  But 
the interests of a nurnber of other n1en1.ber  countries of tbe  Con1,nunity,  an~d of 
the Comrnunity as a  whole,  were tied vp  Y·.'itb  ;c1jl  the :;:e  ic ~'lc: s  and tJ1e  f~tct thztt 
Ireland was in a  position to make a  contribt1.tion to a  successful outcome in respect 
of these matters was clearly beneficial to Irel<1nd's interests  LTl  the bro<idest sense, 
especially at a  tLne when the image of IrclC'Dd  abro;::,.d  h?.e  be~n seriously t;. rnished b:-
not uncle rsl.cCld by p'..lblic  opinion  ou.tside  r._·cland. 
idec..ls.  By jobi.:cg ·.-.rith  other  co~..:r-..~trie s  h0lding  ~:im:Lr -de\\·::.  01~  l.J~~rtict~:l~~r  tcr;ics  - - . 
and there are  a.lmOi:~t always  SOlTcC  of these!  - ?.nd by; rguinz,  cog;o_~.-,tly fer its  (!\c.'n 
point of view bc:tsed on the  pa~·icular i.l1sights afforded,  fo1·  exc>~mple,  by direct 
e v  eri<>nCP  n<  rolo---~-,·lJ."''Y  ov"'-r  ~"  1
1 '.11"  ~-"·'·inr'  T..-olc>~-
1  ,...~.,.,  inflnr:.,-·C''  n~' 1"C<·ptl"bl,- t- •. 11e  -~p  -~·  ~  -~-- - .~-~''-- ~·. 1  "i'-·  c.  ,)  b  !-'~·. ~J,  --~  -~··'- ~-·~··- ··-.  , ___  •  ·- t  '··  ·~  }  ~-
evolution 2nd e:xpres sion c_;:f  Jy~  ..  ::>e  ecc,.-:_.inic ,,:il.dF'-·L::r:al I CJJ;d.e:  cf th··  Ccrr-.I'J'Jnity. 
If one had to SUm up the kind of contribution wnich he:and can lY.<d.k(;  1n th<: se general 
best be described in terms of a  cert~-in  sensitivity of I::eland to tl:.c  possible 
reactions of com1tries outside the  Com~munity to action taken by or  statem~ents made 
on behalf of the  Con-:m:mity.  This sensitivity <ie rives froir.  Irc,lz Lcl 1 s  own 
histCJ:..·ical e:,:r:e:-ience and  t~e possibili-ty it affords oi 2n  irnagir:..<:::ti~ve  insioht :into 
the psychological attitudes of other countries dealing with. what· for most oi them 
is a  lc.rger pov.·cr bloc -a Corr~m',,_::ity of 2.60  rnillion people. -13  ~ 
Ireland and the United Nations 
Between 1955  (when Ireland was admitted to the United Nations) and 1972 a  large 
proportion of the country's diplomatic effort  was concentrated on the United Nations. 
Through its participation in peace -keeping forces,  through its sponsorship of 
resolutions such as that on nuclear proliferation,  and'through its positive· approach 
to the problems of developing countries,  Ireland has since its admission made a 
constructive contribution in the U.N.  framework.  At the time :of  the EEC 
referendum some fears were expressed that this contribution would in some degree 
be  diminished as a  result of member ship of the European Economic Community. 
How realistic have these fears proved to be? 
There has,  of course,  been a  very significant shift in the centre  of gravity of 
Irish policy L11.tere st towards the EEC and the proportion of the  - significantly 
expanded  - resources of the Departlnent of Foreign Affairs devoted to the  United 
Nations,  (although not the absolute arnount) is smaller now than used to be the 
case.  But this shift in priorities has not implied a  change in political attitudes 
to is sues arisLn.g within the United Nations.  Of course,  as part of the Political 
Co -operation process of the  NLn.e  an effort is made to co -ordinate the attitudes of 
member countries  towards resolutions ir:.  the General Assen!bly.  This process of 
co -ordination inevitably involves su1nB p1 e !'. :;;ure on t'i1e  n1ore  'co:;;.se rvative 
1 
countries to adopt mo:>:e  progressive stances,  and sorne pres sure on the more 
'progressive  1  countries to pull back from some of the  stances  they n>ight wish 
to take on certain issues..  These latter pressures are not,  however, very 
significant- the European P1itical Co -operation process has tended,  all other 
things being eque1l,  to shift'\\ ce:1.tre of gravity of the position taken up by the 
Nine States in a 
1progressi~\  Clirectjon.  However,  the post-enlargement 
period in the EEC has  co:i.nc ided  .. vith  c.  period in the United  Nations wh-=n  the 
developing countries have been. tending to harden their line on a  nurnbe r  of 
'colonial-ty-pe' issues,  and the stronger language proposed in :respect of some of 
the resolutions on these subjects has made it impossible for countries like 
Ireland to support resolutions on certain subjects which,  at earlier General 
Assemblies,  when more moderately expressed,  readily secured the  support 
of the Irish delegation.  For example,  a  nu!nber of resolutions now endorse, 
expressly or by implication.~ the use of force.  Ireland has inhibitions on 
advocatir"J.g or endorsing the use of force and its attitude  to these resolutions 
is affected accordbgly. -~. 
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COil!Jtrics  retain  G0r'1c inrkpPndcnce of ilction.  J,J  the  ccollOn~ic :trc·a  this 
in,>pcndcncc: finds its principal expression throngh the conclusion ofbihterill 
agrcCL1Cnts on economic,  industrial,  scientific i1nd technological co-operation with 
non -rncrnber countries.  Co -operation agreemen:ts of this type arc usuaJly de sis  ned 
to provide a  frame\vork to facilitate  the development of co-operative projects between 
commerical,  LTJdustrial and other appropriate interests in the· co1.mtrie s  v.rhich are 
pc_rty to the agreement.  The agreements generally provide that the  contracting 
parties shall make every effort to encourage co·-cperation between the rele.vant 
interests in their  CO"L'ntries  and,  h1  addition to setting out the forms  of co-operation 
envisaged and also occasionally defining the fields in which it is considered there are 
opportu.nitie s  for mutually advantageous co -ope  :;;-2tion,  th·~y also pro dde for regular 
meetings of Joint Cornmissions composed of representatives of the two governments. 
The forms of  co-operation which are usually envisaged in these agreements include 
such matters as t..'he  establishment of joint ventures,  licensh-1g arrangements,  sale of 
'turn key' operations,  joint research and development <c:nd  the provision of 
As the  op:::::..·ation  of these  agreen1.en~ canoften h~ve 5rr:?lic.::~ti.ons  for  t:-<ode,  and 
consequently for the operation of the  Con1.mon Comr.1.ercic;l  Fr.Jicy,  the  individual 
mernber cOU..'1tries of the Cornmtmity,  while retaining their 
area,  are nevertheless S':.!bject to a  com:mitraent to con!:ult  v:it1-~ one another and with 
These agreements n;ay satisfy a  ne.ed on the part of a  non-1ne:.n.ber  E::~t2:e  for an 
inter-governmental juridk2l fram::·;,·o:rl.:  ~..n  the  eco:::.::;:::;ic  field.  Thi:c:  i-::  particularly 
the case for t:he  State -tradmg COlliJ.t:rie s  in Eastern Europe. 
\ 
Aside  fron1  E~stern :Curo1.ear\ ~ountries,  a  n't'rrlber  of  l-.~iddJs  £.- .. st  co~..lr;tries have 
also conchldcd cc--o_;:>2:C2.tic;,  ~::.g\cc;-:-:t-:r::t::::  .. .--:t
1i  ~,.-<:,-~-' 2 1.::"]  :;· :,,..,::c'T  ::' 1 ~:::::::  c:f  's-::e 
Community.  The rapid  e~~_.t:.'2.nsion  co:.  f". equcnt Oil  the  p:r cc:r· :-.rnrnc s  :fc;::  i<1UUE:trialisation 
and economic development \vhich have been undc:o:ctaken by these cou.rJ.t:::ie E  following 
th<::  dramatic L.;_crease in t}-;.ei:;:- oil 1 c:c<::ipts have  in some  i~J[.:.to.ne::. s  piz.ced a 
considerable strain on their administrative resources.  There is o:ften in these 
countries a  distinct preference for co-operative arrange1nents '\Vl1ich  a.re elaborated 
agreement 
U.:.'"1der  the umb:::ella of an i,_;_rer-governnlental/as it is felt t}!at the goods,  s~ills and 
services supplied within the  £ran"'leYrork of these agreements are 1no:re likely to be 
of :the  required standard. ----------- ~-~~ --~--~-~--~----------------
-J c -
Until recently Ireland has had no experience of this type  of agrc,  ·~::·nt  l:ut in 
the context of our Community membership,  and ghcn the opportunity \'.'::tich  these 
agreernents would provide for the devclopn1cnt of forc5gn e;;rnings,  2nd the possib 
contribution ·,vhich they could rnake to our econornic  ;:~nd  social dcvelcp:;ncnt 
through exchanges of experience,  techniqucos  ::..nd  inforrnation,  Ireland is 
cnrre):ttly preparing to  negotiate and  sign cr-'--cper.:ttion cgrecrncnts \Vif11  a  number 
of cotmtries in Eastern Europe and in the  Jd;r:dle East.  It is to h" c:::pe -::ted  that 
in the period immediately ahead a  dgnificant part of Irel;md's c
1iplomatic 
effort will  be concentrated in this area wl1:ic'r:!,  of c''ur:oe,  jnvolves a  CC'l1siderable 
amount of in.ter -departmental  co-operation i-r:1  viev/ of the wide -ran;;;i''lg 
implications of such agreements for agriculture,  industry and other sectiors. 
jnvolves t_'l,.e  relations between Irelc;nd and  ciev~lcp~:'8 ccn.:,_ntries. 
the Corn  ..  -nunity has an important role to play,  ·~.g. 
, 
~1-, :::·c'  .ch  the  I.<:)2ue  Co:1venti01_ 
Nevertheless,  all mem.bers of L~e Comn11mity ha>'e  :>•c:ir  o-''71  bi12-t"?:·al  ;:;.id 
prograrnrnes,  to which they attach considerable i1npor t::nce. 
Until reczntly Ireland  1 s  development aid progr<:>.:-nrr1:c  --·as  e s "~nt:iz  ;~~,.- con£~:, -:d  to 
t_~e  United Nations and a  participant in its specialises "'-z.encit>s,  r: fl  :->.fa  Tl'ler:1br~r 
of the ET!;C. 
U..'"ltil  1973. 
Apart from di\aster relief and a 
tl•nc was, id'\'t,  no such tl1ing 
very srr1all overse:::f' training 
! 
e:.s  an ':·ish bi later2.l aid progr<nnme 
The Irish Gcve rnrnent in 197  4  entered into a  comrnit:.:c.t1t to inc:'  e:o.. c:;e  i.;~ s 
devclopzne:1.t aid both  L"L  absolute terms and as  c..  pE:rcerJt-age  of GI\? ;:.p.:-J·,;.aJ.ly 
thereafter,  with the aim of achieving an increase equivalent to  • 05o/oof GNP 
each year,  tak:LJ.g  one year with another. 
This com.mitr.:1ent now derives added force from. the oblig2.tion impos-.:;d upon 
Ireland by a  Decision of the EEC Council in Ap:ri11974 t.o  achieve the  U. I\.  t;:..rget 
of the provision of . 7o/o  of GNP in the form oi cfiicial ccvelopment aid. 
as the Irish development aid commitment through its multilateral obligations , 
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withi'1 the  Uni'i>~d Nat)ons represented only . 035o/o of GNP in 1972/73,  it is clear 
that a  number of years rnust elapse before this target can be achieved. 
The e::pansion in the totr1J volume of development aid that v.re  11eed  to ensure that 
we fulfil this cornmit;:nent will tend to exceed the  somev,·hat sloy;rer e:.-:pansion of 
This me<ms that ·\ve '.r:ill be 
providLTJ.g  a  growing additional amount which we  could use either to supplement the 
rnultilateral aid provisions,  or to develop a  bil2. teral 2 id progr;:;mrne.  It is the 
intention of the Irish Government  to devote a  signific2.nt part of these add:iticmal 
resources to bilateral aid,  and this process started in 1974.  In the current year a 
sum of £500,000 was provided in the Estimates for bilateral aid  - £150, 000 for 
disaster relief,  £100,000 for the newly-establif'hed Agency for Personal Services 
Overseas,  and  £250, 000 for  specific bilateral projects.  The  year  1976 will see 
2.n  exceptional e:·:pansion  of Ireland 1s  nmltilatcl'al aid  obliga.tic·n b~cause of our 
several re;::.pt;!cts ne:-:t yc2.r,  and also because it  is  d::::~·}r;-,ble·  L'!at its vol;.,nt;:;.ry 
contrib11tions to cert~b U.N.  funds be hc:rcused in 1')76 to some degree.  The 
increase in bilateral aid  i11  1976 will L~erefore be  s·,·-,::-;.11.  i:n  ::o,bsolut('- tc:rms by 
comparison v.-ith what is likely in future years. 
_-. ::.· c [;i" a :7l!"'.tle 
scale m 1977 and therc;:d\-er,  makes H  :~:::ceSS2r:-: to  ::.:3:;:-:··lc.:::- ··;hat !:  .. ·>:.cl  of 
adminj~trative struc'.:urcs will be most appropriate to a  bilc-teral a5d prograrnrne 
LT1volvbg voJuntary effort as,!ll as official aid.  This matter is under consideratio:r: 
-t fu'  <>  nres,.,.-,i· t1.'me  -~,d C011S\!\  1  ~tl'onc:  1 •;;~'' 0  ..-;1·-··"·~·rt  \  ..  ,;·~··.·.·.  i".·-~('!'>"'t:ted  g:co·.~pS 'v•'lth  a.  - r  --·- ~  c  .l.i.  ~  .  _  .~.._.......  ..  t  "'  ._  ...  ~  ... ct  ~·  L-.........  ,  _  _ 
;:;.  vi.e"-·.r  to erlc·:.:r5.:tlg  t112.t.  v-:l1.;·~e"\·  -:r  a.d::·r1·:_~:5.(:.trc.ti-:, ::.  ~-,;;:-·~  ·:  ~;:::  :~_:r~:  ~P:.::-~~---·
1_~::}1E-~  _n_~;::---.;  .::. 
f  f  .  .  , 1  .  .  ,  .  f  - ~f  .  1  •  •  the  ullest use o  tne  lilta!, y  1n1por-cant  e_e!nen~ o  ·,·c.f.1'~Jt2.ry  e':_ort  L-r:.  t  ns spnere. 
The criteria which will be applied :in  clevelopjDg an a.pprcpriate admir1.istrative 
structure will i,-,.clude the need to reduce to the nece E.;.-;ary  m5nirnu!n L'-le  number 
of controlling or co-ordi11ati<>g bodies, the need to mobilise volu...l1.tary  ei:fort fully, 
the need to  secure co-ordL11ation of development aid policy at the political  level, 
and the need to ensure e£:ficiency in  ad:-~1:inistration and control of and ac.cou..'!tability 
·"'  for funds. ..... 
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An aim of policy v1ill be to secure a  rneasure of concentration of bilateral "id 
in a  relatively smaJl number of the poorest countries Y/here  its irnpact could be 
si_:nificant a.nd visible to Irish public opinion,  which  couJd  in thiE  '.c·ay be rnohiliscd 
rnore effectively in favour of an expansion of Ireland's development::: 5d  cornrnihnc; 
An aspect of development aid programmes which rnu st not 1)e  ove: :::-leoobid  is t11e 
e:..::tent to which they generate a  demand for  goods and services Irorn industri:Jlised 
countries and in p2rticular the donor co1mtries.  This is t-rue not merely of 
bilateral aid programrnes,  some of v.1lich  o.re to a  s:igdf}·~cmt degree anc;led 
to'\vards achieving reciprocal benefits L<  this ;vay,  but also ·,trith respect to 
multilateral aid programmes.  Thus,  for exarnple,  the aid provided under  L~e 
, 
Lome Convention will be largely spent within the European Econornic Cornm1Jnity 
on goods and services,  including consultancy services in  such areas as 
cnr:;ineerin::;,  building and con:otruccicm,  etc.  Such develcprr.ents as this ha\'e 
eccnon'lic implications for Ireland which must not b.::;  ove:lc·oked. 
C O~'JSTRAINTS ON IRJSH FOREIGN POLICY? 
the Community,  aim_ed in the direction of a  streng:h ening of the Community 
bst1tutions and of :i.ts  decision-makLTlg processes. 
An obvious constrc.int is,.~ course,  the  small size of the Irish dip1orn~tic 
service by cornparison v:i~,  \hose of seven of the  T}ine  othe-r  rc1::::<11;:Jers  of the 
Co~n:no:.ity.  Th.:::::e  is a  cl\;;.r lirnit to ti:e  a::-•Otn1t  o£  d}~o!_.,,natic  ;-_ctivity that 
Ireland can  "~.J..."1dertaJ:e  given that its diplomatic sen-ice nu:-:nbers less than 200 
people and that its diplomatic missions abroad are limited to 23 residential 
etnbassies,  3 permanent mi.ssions  (in Geneva,  Brussels and  :t~ev.· York),  and 
5  1t;:areer 1  Consulates.  In addition to the traditional tasks of bilateral diplomacy, 
this :;mall diplomatic team must service a  multiplicity of internc..tional conference?, 
as well as the immensely detailed policy worl~ involved ir. participation in the 
European Conununity and in European Political Co-operation  . This personnel constr;-..:.int is rnuch less sif!nificant than it rniriht be bec:<ll se of 
~  0 
the exceptional quality and dedication of the members of this  small group 
~-:h5 d1 h;-; s  made possible,  \Vith generous help from r:oany horne De:partrnents 
C(,;yerned '\i:t::h  particular areas of activity,  a  diplornatic effort quite disproport-
ior:E-te to the ,.-,-:::1nbers. involved.  Thus,  even during Ire1and1s  Presidency of 
the  Ccr...:ncil of Ministers of the EEC,  the nur.0ber of occasions on whic~ it proved 
n'.:c .. :s sary for Ireland to delegate the repr2 sentat:i.on of the Presidency in a 
Col::-Hnittee or "N or.king Group to aiJOther  Cornmunity country were very few 
ir.td e: ed.  Nevertheless,  realistically there is a  limit to the  sc2le of what can be 
urHlcrtaken by a  small country \dth a  srnall diplo1.naUc  r-c.::v:i ce. 
A  second constrai.t.>t is the fact that,  as w2s pointed  out e<lrlier,  Irel<:tnd  is to 
In  s c- c· king 
too rnuch in the role of constant  1  tl...:.:knd.cu.L- 1 •  ~ >:.·..:·t C\'C.r,  i.o  the extent thn..t  its 
the  Comm1.mity. 
A  £·,:::-ther question arises of course because of L:·t::-la.:1d's  pocit~on Hl.  !'•:.:lation 
to  r::·lilita:ry  all5z~nce~.  Ir~land 1 s nor:-pardcipation in  ~'JATO has posed no 
Ej;;::!i£ica:c.t prob:e:tn fori\  \.th]n  th? Corn·;·•ur..ity  ::.:~.':re·::r:•rl:,  b::cc::use of the 
!:0::.;-,::ratc:-.tc::s  of the  Cc·":·'"~~::1ity  f::-c"~"  r:A'XO,  .... irr ~.- ''  '"  '·  -,  1·="  -,.  ~ .  .r  no 
the other hc:.nd the fact has to be faced that the de ">'eloprnent of the  Co1n:1"lunity 
protection of Ireland  1s  material interests and '\vould rn2..)dmise  the redistributive 
role of Community pelicies,  could logically bring in its  train at some  stage 
a  need to consider some khld of cor'.'l.rnitme,1t to defend this structure.  This 
is not an im.mediate p:-o:;pect,  hov:ever,  not just because of Irel&nd 1s 
particular stance in the matter,  but also because a  number of other colmtries, 
such as the Netherlands and Den1no.rk,  o.re  reluctz-"'nt to see thE:  E:mergence of -20-
a  comn10n defence policy within the Community lc st this cut across and dimi.Tlish 
the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,  and of the  cor.r~nitrne:c-1t 
of L~e United States to the North Atlantic Alliance. 
I have used the terrn 'constraints'.  But they could,  I think,  better be:  dcscr3bed 
not as  constraints but as factors which we must realistically take L.1to  ~icconnt 
as we pur sue an active foreign policy with:in the C ornnmnity.  It  shouLi be cl<:ar 
f:.tom vJhat I have said here tonight that_  we do pur sue such a  policy. 
of those 
De spite 
so:m3 setbacks,  the hopes/of u.::.;  who  e::-:pected rncn1bership of the  Co·::,~·:'l1.mHy to 
open new perspectives for  Ireland are being fulfilled. 
tonight it should be evident: 
From v:hat I have  said 
:f'i;r.;=_b  that membership has been of direct economic benefit to  Irel~n::rl :.:.nd has 
es':;:hlished  its traditicnal relatior::::hip with Britain on  a  new and rnon; hcc,l:_'1y 
basis to t..'he  benefit o:f both cow1tries. 
Ses;s.>.~.'!.  t..'ltat  we have been able to take a  forward position on  the fuh.:::-e 
evclution of the Community and its institutions.  We  a1·e  try-L~g to v:o:rl: actively 
ar:..y form of discrimination. 
T1.~ird,  that our n'lembership opens new possibilities at a  more gene:·alleYel 
b  vrodd affairs.  W ith~the limits of our resources as a  Sln<'-11 country we 
are ava ili.ng of these pos  ~ i  ilitie  s  to play a  m.ore active :·ole than befcrc in some 
fL?lds  a;1<l1:o  i11:8uence in a  1in1iteci,  ·:-.mt  neverLbeh~ss :::.gnificant,  wa)  L'•e 
evolvu>.g policies o£ the Cornm.unity to·.vards the rest of t'lte  \vorld. 
These developments in our foreign policy consequent on membership are 
significant and encouraging.  I believe they will continue in the  period ahead. 
And I  can assure you that it is my own intention to contribute as far as I  can 
to ensurbg that they do so. 